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The surge of Preferential Trade Agreements across Asia: 








Economists along with policy makers are generally viewing trade agreements as a ‘second 
best’ process for trade expansion and economic growth on a global scale. The current surge 
of  Preferential  Trade  Agreements  on  a  bilateral  basis,  particularly  in  Asia,  is  somehow 
challenging such common view. The following paper is grounded on updated rough facts and 
put forward that the standard economic approach is a bit flawed. Obviously, the outcomes 
and prospects for Asian countries seem much more problematic insofar as power asymmetry 
and discrimination are embedded in these arrangements. 
 






Nowadays, Asia is highlighting a surge of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), incorrectly 
called Free Trade Agreements, as a new experience. As a result, Asia has been propelled to 
the  forefront  of  a  more  general  phenomenon  which  started  in  the  1980s,  inflated  at  the 
beginning of the 1990s and picked up speed since 1995. So far, more than 300 PTAs have 
been  notified  to  the  WTO  with  more  than  half  in  force.  Beyond  their  diversity  these 
arrangements have in common that they have both a bilateral and preferential incline. 
However, the current wave is not a new phenomenon. In the 1950s and 1960s there were 
similar waves but to a lesser extent around the European construction. Likewise, it's not an 
autonomous phenomenon but rather endogenous to the ongoing trade liberalization process: 
the GATT/ WTO charter makes explicit provisions for them. But their scope largely exceeds 
eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers, which were their raison d' être at the beginning. 
The main reason behind this new drive is to be found in the difficulties and frustrations to 
finalize the most recent multilateral trade negotiations (1986-1994). So far, these rounds of 
negotiations  have  been  a  powerful  and  undeniable  driver  for  the  liberalization  and  the 
continuous expansion of international trade. Since 1947, the average ad valorem tariffs on 
industrial goods in developed countries have been dramatically reduced from 40 percent to 
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Author manuscript, published in "N/P"less than 4 percent; nevertheless, agricultural products’ trade has not achieved such a goal due 
to protectionist policies of industrialized nations
1. Moreover, the WTO which succeeded to 
the  GATT  in  1994  is  currently  made  up  of  nearly  150  members  with  disparate  views; 
decisions need time due to consensus rule, coalition games, and an agenda with a continually 
extended scope: almost ten years were required to finalize the Uruguay round. 
Equally important was the increasing U.S. support for PTAs after the failure of the Seattle 
ministerial conference in 1999, in sharp contrast with the 1950s and 1960s, when the U.S. 
trade administration was strongly opposed to any such arrangement. For Krugman (1991) the 
waning of the U.S. capacity and will to defend trade multilateralism is of main importance. 
As a result, bilateralism bas become an alternative to multilateralism, and flexibility and speed 
are  increasingly  put  forward  by  its  promoters,  but  it  is  also  a  vector  of  proliferation  for 
preferential arrangements. The ongoing upsurge of PTAs through Asia challenges the global 
trade architecture built on the non-discriminatory principle and weakens any comprehensive 
regional integration scheme. ASEAN cohesiveness and its fledgling identity as the regional 
grouping are threatened by the growing rivalry between China, Japan, and South Korea, and 
to some degree India. 
I.  Definition and scope 
 
1.1. Definition 
For the sake of clarity, let's recall to some basic definitions and draw a typology. Since the 
pioneering work of Bela Balassa (1962), PTAs are generally viewed as the first stage of an 
economic  integration  process  which  can  result  after  several  sequences  to  a  truly  political 
union  (Figure  1).  PTA  members  reduce  tariffs  along  with  non-tariffs  barriers
2  among 
themselves but keep their original tariffs against the rest of the  world  — i.e. there is no 
common  external  tariff  as  in  Customs  Unions.  Free  Trade  Agreements  or  FTAs  are  the 
extension and natural outcome of the previous ones wherein each member dismantles totally 
trade barriers among them, but keep their former tariffs with non-members countries. Asia is 
largely  concerned  by  PTAs  due  to  the  novelty  of  the  phenomenon  and  the  will  of  most 
countries to retain some independence in trade policy toward non-members. 
Interestingly, PTAs, FTAs and Custom Unions are called Regional Trade Agreements in the 
WTO terminology, whereas in the Belassa view they are embodied in a first tier denominated 
shallow integration. 
These  arrangements  concern  either  countries  of  similar  development  level  endowed  with 
comparable resources, mainly developed countries, or countries with different development 
level endowed with distinct resources. They also concern agreements between countries and 
regional  groupings  (China-ASEAN  or  Japan-ASEAN  agreements).  Lastly,  they  are  not 
limited  to  a  specific  region,  taking  into  account  propinquity,  but  increasingly  involve 
countries from distant regions (see agreements concluded between South Korea and Chile, or 
Japan and Mexico). 
In the economic literature, PTAs or FTAs are still regarded as nearly identical whereas in the 
real  world  heterogeneity  is  the  rule;  the  academic  interest  is  focused  on  trade  effects 
stemming from tariffs reductions with the perspective of welfare improvement along with the 
growth of international trade even if a minority strand of research emphasizes strategic and 
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Figure 1: The route to the economic integration 
Source: from B. Belassa 
 
1.2. Scope 
PTAs are at odds with the WTO first article known as the unconditional most-favoured nation 
principle, which stipulates that every trade advantage that a member gives to any country 
must be extended, immediately and unconditionally, to all other members. Historical reasons 
explain this peculiarity: at the beginning, the treaty setting up the GATT had to include the 
British Commonwealth which was a free trade area. Consequently, a derogation of the non-
discrimination principle was introduced in the founding charter (Article XXIV), and thereafter 
endorsed by the WTO. 
To date, the WTO has three provisions allowing trade preferences on a reciprocal basis
3: 
i/ since 1948, the Article XXIV (§ 4 to 10) provides an exception for free trade areas 
and customs unions which discriminate against other GATT members. This provision was 
updated  in  1994.  It  is  solely  by  this  measure  that  developed  countries  can  enjoy  trade 
preferences;  the  European  Economic  Community  and  NAFTA  were  both  based  on  this 
dispensation. Moreover, any arrangement between developing countries and developed ones 
is based on it. But these agreements must meet specific conditions, such as transparency and 
neutrality against non-members, and they particularly should apply to ‘substantially all trade’ 
for a reasonable length of time. What is meant by substantial? The GATT article is helpless as 
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an unilateral basis. 
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7the precise definition does not exist. However, if we refer to EU documents, over 90 percent 
of ‘all trade’ would have to be completely free. And, as long as PTAs do not violate the 
provisions of the WTO, they can include a wide range of arrangements; likewise, they can 
discard contentious matters as specific farm products: for example, rice was excluded at the 
onset of trade negotiations between Thailand and Japan; 
ii/  since  1979,  the  Enabling  Clause  allows  less-developed  countries  to  agree  for 
mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers on products imported from 
one another through bilateral or regional arrangements. These requirements are more flexible 
than those contained in aforementioned Article XXIV since, for example, they permit the 
exchange  of  preferences  on  a  subset  of  products,  and  the  partial  reduction,  rather  than 
elimination, of trade barriers. Agreements notified under the Enabling Clause have merely to 
be  formally  notified  to  the  WTO.  They  are  part  of  a  more  general  approach  promoting 
differential  and  more  favourable  treatment  for  those  countries  as  well  as  the 
acknowledgement  of  a  non-reciprocity  principle  in  trade  negotiations.  The  ASEAN  Free 
Trade  Agreement  (AFTA)  and  the  MERCOSUR/  MERCOSUL  are  grounded  on  this 
provision; 
iii/ and, since 1994, the Article V from the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS)  supplies  an  exception  to  the  most-favoured  nation  principle.  This  provision  was 
included  in  the  latest  agreements  —  e.g.  between  Australia  and  Singapore  (2003),  and 
between Chile and South Korea (2004). 
 
Furthermore,  the  latest  PTAs  tend  to  include  ‘Singapore  issues’  (investment,  competition 
policy, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurements). For example, if the 
facilitation of customs procedure and documentation requirement has long been pointed out as 
a common objective for both developed and developing countries, to move forward it still 
requires substantial technical assistance to developing countries in order to strengthen their 
fledging administrative capacities. More generally, these issues have not yet been approved 
by the WTO members on a whole
4. 
Finally, PTAs occasionally include provisions about harmonization or mutual recognition of 
technical standards, electronic commerce promotion... and even political and security aspects 
which are not at all related to trade liberalization! If the former is rather beneficial for trade 
expansion the latter is much more problematic due paradoxically to the lack of transparency 
(for example when military interests are at play) or to very sensitive issues, such as national 
sovereignty. 
To  sum  up,  the  capacity  of  PTAs  to  continuously  expand  their  scope  along  with  their 
customization explains the diversity of their wording (comprehensive economic cooperation, 
closer economic partnership...), but the current proliferation of such arrangements, notably in 
Asia, is a serious challenge to the multilateral framework, and also a new basis for national 
rivalry. 
II.  The Asian drive 
 
It has to be reminded that the most important part of PTAs is still located in Europe with 100 
in force in 2004 for a world total of 150. Until the end of the 1990s, Asia has been lagging far 
behind Europe, and even South and Central America. 
                                                 








































7However, nowadays the trend is clearly shifting to Asia, and once again a catching-up process 
is somehow at play (Table 1). 
 
 



































Early Harvest Programme for some agricultural products 
trade and economic framework 
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restraints on labor mobility 
comprehensive agreement 
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comprehensive agreement exceeding current commitments at the WTO 

































Early Harvest Programme 
partial agreement 
gradual elimination of bilateral tariffs barriers on goods 
gradual elimination of bilateral tariffs barriers on goods 
partial liberalization 
 
* Signed Free-Trade Agreements with Bhutan and Nepal giving their goods free access to the Indian market, and 











































2.1. The causes of the Asian delay 
Here, two main factors stand out. 
First, is the lack of an institutionalized process for regionalization despite ASEAN. There 
is convincing evidence that PTAs were fuelled in Europe by the integration process along 
with the enlargement perspectives. To some extent, Asia's late coming is not only due to the 
lack of political will from Asian leaders but also to the U.S. opposition to any real economic 
cooperation on a regional basis (Hamilton-Hart 2003). Although the ‘Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation’ (APEC) group with U.S. membership was set up in 1989, the subsequent ‘East 
Asian  Community’  project  advocated  by  the  Prime  minister  of  Malaysia,  and  the  ‘Asian 
Monetary Fund’ proposed by the Japanese Prime minister were vehemently opposed by the 
United States, and they failed. 
Second, up to the year 2000, the strong backing for the multilateral agenda highlighted by 
the  Japanese  authorities  was  notoriously,  and  they  have  been  reluctant  to  abandon  the 
multilateral framework which had been beneficial for Japanese firms. The same is true for 
South Korean authorities. 
 
 
2.2. The catching-up process 
The proposition to the ASEAN leaders, to implement a FTA for 2011, proposed by China 
after  joining  the  WTO,  has  ignited  the  Asian  drive.  Although  not  mentioned  in  official 
reports, this initiative was a ‘wake up’ call for Japan, and therefore fuelled a bandwagon 
effect through Asia with each country wanting to be on board and not be excluded (‘me too’ 
attitude). 
In the same time, the Asian frenzy for PTAs was stirred by political-economy motives 
resulting  from  the  interplay  between  sectors  likely  to  gain  from  the  set-up  of  such 
arrangements, and others that would be adversely affected by them. But such balance is 
inherently  unstable  and  rife  with  conflict  between  interest-group  lobbies.  This  is 
particularly true for Japan where the interests of the business community are growingly 
coalescing with those of lawmakers and policy makers, as farmers are losing their political 
clout due to their aging. 
Governments have a preference for PTAs as the stakes and the related outcomes can be 
better explained to the public. Besides, those negotiations are often used as a lever to stir 
domestic adjustments and implement reforms. However, in some cases, the process is not 
smooth and is blocked by national assemblies. For example, the most protected sectors such 
as agriculture in South Korea and Japan are strongly opposed to those deals. It is hardly 
surprising that, in 2003, the endorsement of a trade agreement both between Mexico and 
Japan, and Chile and South Korea collapsed. 
 
 
2.3. The purposes followed by major countries 
We focus on large countries — i.e. with significant size market — which are already well 
engaged in FTAs negotiations and implementation. Singapore and Thailand are both at the 
forefront of the Asian drive; South Korea is still behind Japan despite a current catching-up; 
whereas India is just taking initiatives in this field (Table 1). 
• China has an obvious interest in following the WTO discipline to allow relatively 
unhindered access to the large EU and North American markets to fuel export growth. 








































7get preferential access to expanding markets (Mallon and Whalley, 2004). As a large 
manufactured  goods  exporter,  China  seeks  to  stress  preferential  access  in  these  areas 
through tariffs reductions. The agreements already concluded or still in progress have in 
common a general statement, and they lack explicit process to solve trade disputes. 
• The United States follows a policy combining three levels (multi-layered): multilateral, 
regional and bilateral. Under the Trade Promotion Authority (also known as ‘fast track’) 
the administration negotiates trade agreements and the Congress restricts itself to approve 
or reject a negotiated deal, within strict time limits and without amendment. The scope of 
policy  exceeds  trade  aspects  as  the  United  States  is  the  champion  of  arrangements 
covering a broad spectrum with particular stress on services liberalization and intellectual 
property rights enforcement. In this regard, there is clearly a strategic dimension based on 
national interest which includes the following features (Feinberg 2003): 
-  asymmetric  reciprocity  due  notably  to  market  power  that  advantageously  opens 
foreign markets for U.S. traders and investors; 
- establishment by the U.S. Trade Representative of new precedents or models to use as 
benchmarks in future trade, called competitive liberalization; 
-  rewarding  and  supporting  domestic  market-oriented  reformers  as  was  the  case  for 
Mexico, and advancing local democratic institutions; 
-  and,  reaffirming  and  strengthening  U.S.  security  interests  through  strategic 
partnerships. 
 
After demonstrating an interest in the Asian zone, particularly the ASEAN countries, the 
U.S. administration interest is tilting to South America
5. And if the economic impact of 
PTAs on U.S. GDP has been quite small — as barriers to trade and investment flows are 
already  low  in  most  domestic  sectors  —  FTAs  have  been  elevated  into  the  centre  of 
national trade strategy and supported by a broad-based coalition of bureaucratic interests. 
• Japan is mimicking the U.S. multi-layered approach for its trade. The regional priority 
is Asia, particularly ASEAN, after the initiative taken by China in 2002. Farm products 
are still put aside in order to protect Japanese farmers, but contrary to the USA or the EU, 
trade  negotiations  are  not  a  smooth  process  due  to  a  turf  war  between  Japanese 
administrations. 
III.  What is at stake? Some potential effects 
 
The identification and the measure of the PTAs effects are not an easy task. These difficulties 
are  yet  increased  by  the  novelty  of  the  phenomenon  in  Asia  and  its  current  instability; 
moreover,  it  is  particularly  difficult  to  distinguish  what  has  been  signed  from  what  is 
effectively in force inasmuch as many agreements are more ambitious in aspiration than in 
implementation. 
Nevertheless, it's possible in an exploratory attempt to put forward some hypotheses on the 
potential effects drawn from economic theory and prior experiences along with initial results. 
Three major effects can be checked off. 
                                                 
5 As part of the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade agreement, the U.S. administration signed in 
2004 agreements with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic; 
in parallel, it opened negotiations with three members of the Andean Community (Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) 
along  with  Panama.  And,  despite  troubled  negotiations,  the  ambitious  ‘Free  Trade  Area  of  the  America’ 








































7Firstly, they affect trade flows and foreign direct investment. The economic literature is 
still largely focused on trade flows, and a reading of the current agreement contents reveals 
that foreign investment has become a top priority on government agendas. Moreover, in the 
mid  to  long-term  these  agreements  can  have  implications  for  the  economic  growth 
performance of members by raising the incentive to innovate through technological spill-
overs, pro-competitive effects, and reduction of redundancies in R&D activities. 
Secondly,  they  impact  international  relations  by  reflecting  significant  power 
asymmetries.  PTAs  are  bilateral  in  nature  and  involve  face-to-face  bargaining.  By 
implication, related costs and time spent could be a burden for the scare negotiating resources 
of most developing countries. 
Thirdly, they directly affect the multilateral trading system. A large body of literature 
has already addressed this question and therefore we shall not discuss this point. 
 
3.1. Trade effects 
The effect of PTAs on Asian trade is still negligible when compare to other regions as 
Western Europe (EU)
6, North America (NAFTA) or even South America (MERCOSUR). 
To  date,  there  are  no  Asian  PTA  deals  with  significant  trade  flows  except  the  project 
between Japan and South Korea which came to a standstill during the 2004 (Table 2). And 
when PTAs are in place its coverage could be limited. For example, less than 10 percent of 
intra-ASEAN  trade  is  under  the  ASEAN  Free  Trade  Area's  common  preferential  tariff 
scheme (The Economist, 2004). 
 
Table 2. Share of exports related to PTAs finalized by major Asian countries (in US$ billion) 
 








Chile                   0.5 





Japan  Singapore           14.9 
Philippines           9.0  







China *  ASEAN                26 
 
438.2  6 % 
Actually, through the ‘Early Harvest Programme’ only trade of some basic agricultural products would be fully 
liberalized by 2006. 
 
Source: from Hyun and Hong (2005) 
 
 
If has to be remembered that these trade arrangements primarily concern tariffs and non-
tariffs reductions. The insights provided by Jacob Viner's seminal contribution in 1950 are 
still valid: if PTAs and FTAs entail significant trade effects one cannot draw straightforward 
welfare effects due to the possibility to bring about ‘trade creation’ or 
‘trade diversion’ — i.e. 
                                                 








































7PTAs may augment intra-bloc trade by diverting trade away from non-member economies. 
This ambiguous feature has been underlined by later researches (Grossman and Helpman, 
1995; Krishna 1998) using political-economy constructs. Hence, they have showed that trade 
diversion could be an important motive leading to PTAs. 
Empirical  approaches  suggest  that  Asian  PTAs  have  enhanced  regional  trade  (Clarete, 
Edmonds and Wallack, 2003), but the effect is less important than in other regions which can 
arguably be explained by  the novelty of the phenomenon. For example, under the ‘Early 
Harvest Programme’, Thailand's exports of vegetables increased, in the first quarter of 2004, 
by 38 percent, and fruits by 80 percent (Ankietwicz and Whalley, 2004), but the overall trade 
share  is  still  low:  the  previous  programme  covered  1.2  billion  of  dollars  in  2003, 
corresponding just to 1.6 percent of trade flows between ASEAN and China (Inama 2005). 
Due to low average tariffs (10 percent), except in some Asian countries for mega-tariffs, rules 
of origin — which are an important component of PTAs
7 — constitute a true challenge
8, even 
when their economic rationale is to prevent the import of any particular commodity from 
entering  through  the  country  with  the  lowest  duty  on  the  item  in  question  and  being  re-
exported to other member countries. 
For example, rules of origin were put forward by the Japanese administration in the first trade 
talks with Mexico. Simulations had showed that NAFTA had adverse effects on Japanese 
exports to Mexico: from 1994 to 2000, the share of Japanese imports in the overall Mexican 
imports decreased continuously from 6 percent in 1994 to 3.5 in 2000, corresponding to a 
yearly export gap of around 400 billion yen. 
But the setting up of rules of origin can be problematic at least for two reasons. First, a strict 
application can induce protectionism against non-member countries, hence it diverts trade. 
Second, the continuous increase of PTAs can entail a bundle of confusing and overlapping 
bilateral  deals,  known  as  a  ‘spaghetti  bowl’  syndrome,  constituting  a  nightmare  for  the 
various actors, custom officers and private sector that have to implement, to enforce or to 
comply with those regulations. 
To sum up, it is still too early to gauge the effects of PTAs and particularly the rules of origin 
on trade flows through Asia. 
 
 
3.2. Effects on FDI localization 
Asian trade was multiplied by 2.5 during the 1990 decade, inward FDI flows were multiplied 
by 7 for the same period. And in the case of China, the gap was even more dramatic: here, 
international  trade  was  multiplied  by  four  whereas  FDI  inflows  increased  by  a  factor  of 
eleven! 
So it is not surprising that incentives to attract FDIs are the most common component of 
Asian PTAs. In fact, it is the first motive for developing countries
9 to embrace the current 
wave of FTAs, and start negotiations with developed countries which are the main providers 
of FDI flows. 
Here, central commitments are national treatment, most-favoured nation treatment for foreign 
investors  alongside  provisions  relating  to  expropriation,  compensation,  and  repatriation  of 
earnings (Banda and Whalley, 2005). 
To date, PTAs have had very little influence on the investment localization. But as more 
PTAs are put forward the situation may be changing and affect the whole production sharing 
                                                 
7 They specify a certain proportion of the value — added that must have within union — origin to quality for 
duty-free; status in the PTAs. In this regard, rules of origin to up 200 pages in the NAFTA agreement. 
8 Indeed, they also entail a political economy dimension as interest groups can exploit them for their own ends. 








































7dynamic across Asia. 
Accordingly, it's rather a tricky undertaking to size up the effects of PTAs provisions on 
foreign investment, because they are enmeshed with others effects resulting, for example, 
from tariffs reduction. If tariffs are retained, an enterprise will invest overseas by setting up a 
subsidiary  company  in  order  to  supply  a  protected  market  (tariff  jumping),  instead  of 
exporting and paying tariffs. A PTA with this country automatically makes the market less 
protected, hence reducing its attractiveness to invest
10. An enterprise can also invest overseas 
in order to reap various comparative advantages regarding different manufacturing processes: 
semi-final goods or components need to be exported to other plants, operations which incur 
tariffs. Therefore, by reducing these costs a PTA can increase foreign investment, and trans-
national  corporations  could  enlarge  their  international  division  of  labour.  But  these 
arrangements  can  have  adverse  effects  by  raising  transactions  costs  (rules  of  origin 
requirements), and encouraging concentration on few localisations. 
The  national  origin  of  FDI  is  also  a  key  element  as  the  impact  depends  on  whether  the 
supplier country is part of the trade agreement. In the case of NAFTA, FDI from the United 
States and Canada have been significantly increased in Mexico after 1994 (Waldkirch 2001); 
thus, the creation or the extension of preferential trade zones can divert FDI, and this could be 
particularly problematic for countries with high manufacturing costs. 
 
 
3.3. Effects on international relations 
It is well known that the international stage encompasses substantial power games effects 
where large countries enjoy bargaining power on account of their economic size and political 
clout. The wave of bilateralism across Asia through PTAs carries such risks even if talks and 
negotiations conducing to trade agreements are in line with the WTO framework. 
It has to be reminded, that most Asian countries have more benefited from the multilateral 
negotiations through the GATT/ WTO system than through face-to-face negotiations with the 
United States. Indeed, in multilateral arena Asian countries can better share and advocate 
common interests through a mutually advantageous approach. 
But the current multilateral framework is marred with various difficulties. The entire system 
is  challenged  by  the  necessity  to  keep  on  with  the  expansion  of  international  trade  — 
particularly, to tackle pending issues such as the liberalization of agricultural products' trade, 
or to grasp new ones as the enhancement of trade facilitation — and a decision-taking process 
which is growingly time-consuming. In some extent, the situation is similar to the EU one 




IV.  Are Asian PTAs enhancing regional trade and a step to economic integration? 
 
The ongoing proliferation of PTAs across Asia, let alone with other regions, requires not 
minimizing  the  risks  for  regional  trade  along  with  economic  integration.  Some 
recommendations can be drawn from the initial results. 
First,  inasmuch  as  PTAs  are  partial,  fragmentary,  heterogeneous,  and  above  all 
uncoordinated, it stands to reason to seek harmonizing the different rules and regulatory codes 
attached to the various Asian PTAs. Obviously, the lack of cooperation is crucial and the 
following question has to be raised: which institution or framework would be in charge to 
tackle  the  task.  Arguably,  the  logical  candidate  is  the  ‘ASEAN  plus  three’  forum  whose 
                                                 








































7members carry the bulk of Asia's trade. However, historical and strategic motives, particularly 
the  growing  rivalry  between  Japan  and  China,  impaired  the  organization  taking  effective 
initiatives with convincing political will. 
In our view the main challenge for Asian countries is to keep on pace with a trade-led growth 
regime based on a manufacturing sharing configuration on a trans-regional base. Accordingly, 
it will be particularly appropriate to have PTAs focusing on trade environment. Indeed, due to 
the specificity of Asian trade (intra-regional flows of intermediate goods and strong FDI-trade 
nexus) the following undertakings would have a great impact on Asia trade: trade facilitation 
(notably the easing of customs procedure and documentation requirements), the promotion of 
cross-border investments, and to some  extent, the liberalization of people mobility across 
borders from geographically contiguous countries. 
To be effective this drive has to get strong political support, and major Asian countries should 
be the promoters and advocates of this route toward regional trade integration. In addition, 
these commitments could be more easily endorsed by the WTO in coming negotiations. 
In parallel, it would be appropriate to largely disseminate general guidelines supporting this 
orientation, and multinational bodies like the Asian Development Bank could endorse this 
helpful job. 
Second, PTAs could also impact significantly economic integration. To date, Asia has no 
regional  undertaking  apart  from  ASEAN,  but  ASEAN  is  quite  different  from  the  EU  or 
NAFTA.  Indeed,  when  one  gives  closer scrutiny  to ASEAN, it appears to be basically  a 
formal grouping of altogether heterogeneous countries. Of course, regional integration was 
given a new impetus during the Bali summit in October 2003 — by putting the year 2020 as 
the deadline for implementing a common market. In fact, the aim was to speed up the ongoing 
PTAs, which had yet to be implemented (Stubbs 2000). Trade barriers are still there along 
with sizeable hurdles for investment and people mobility: a sole market for ASEAN countries 
is not for today. Such a delay is largely due to a lack of political leadership and economic 
interdependency, along with inadequate designs and drafting modalities for effective trade 
liberalization (Inama 2005). As said previously the liberalization process entailed by AFTA is 
very slow. 
As a result, the rising tide of PTAs across Asia could shape the whole regional economic 
dynamism. The ‘stylized facts’ approach which had pointed out a two-hubs (China and Japan) 
or a multiple-hubs (ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea) emerging design highlighting the 
chaotic and uneven path to regional integration. 
Here, the recommendations to be made are more challenging. They require an unequivocal 
commitment by large countries to facilitate trade integration of less-developed countries, not 
to mention the poor ones. Likewise, major countries must restrain to embark in a race for 
strategic trade policy, and rather promote cooperation in multilateral and regional arena. 
Developing countries on their own must cooperate, exchange information and experiences, 
and pool scare administrative resources. They must also be cautious not to be involved in 
binding rules, and favour cooperative arrangements with safeguard measures. 
After  all,  an  alternative  option  to  economic  integration  could  be  to  advance  financial 
integration at the region level. For example, the expansion of current initiative such as the 
‘Asian Bond Market initiative’ toward more financial linkages could be of great interest due 
to the large amount of foreign currency reserves held by Asian central banks. By doing so, 
Asian countries would modify the sequence of the stepping stones conducing to economic 
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